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Higher emotional clarity, the extent to which people unambiguously identify, label, and describe their
own emotions, is related to a host of positive intrapersonal factors but its relation to interpersonal factors
is unexplored. We hypothesized that emotional clarity would be related to cognitive empathy (i.e.,
perceiving others’ emotions) and to accurately understanding others’ negative affect (NA), but not
positive affect (PA), in the context of a stressful situation. After completing self-reports of trait emotional
clarity and cognitive and affective empathy (i.e., one’s emotional reaction to others), participants (N 
94 undergraduate students; i.e., perceivers) viewed a series of video clips of adults (i.e., targets)
completing a stressful laboratory task in a previous research study. Before and after the stress task, targets
reported their state NA and PA. While viewing the recordings, perceivers rated how they thought the
targets were feeling at the corresponding time points. Correspondence between perceivers’ and targets’
affect ratings were used as indices of the outcome variable, performance-based cognitive empathy. As
expected, self-reported emotional clarity was related to the self-reported cognitive, but not affective,
empathy. Moreover, perceivers’ emotional clarity was related to higher cognitive empathy for NA not PA
after the stressful task. Our findings provide preliminary support for the importance of emotional clarity
in the ability to accurately understand others’ affective experiences, which has important interpersonal
implications.
Keywords: emotional clarity, empathic accuracy, empathy
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Emotional clarity is the extent to which people unambiguously
identify, label, and describe their own emotions (Gohm & Clore,
2000). Lower emotional clarity is associated with various forms of
psychopathology (Vine & Aldao, 2014). Higher emotional clarity
is associated with better health and psychological outcomes (Ex-
tremera & Fernández-Berrocal, 2006; Koven & Thomas, 2010), as
well as a variety of cognitive functions (e.g., better initiation
control, self-monitoring, working memory, and other executive
functions; Koven & Thomas, 2010). Although the intrapersonal
associations of emotional clarity have been widely examined, the
interpersonal outcomes associated with emotional clarity, which
we posit are also important to social emotion regulation (Marro-
quín, 2011), helping behavior (Smith, 2006), and interpersonal
relationships, are less understood. As an initial step toward under-
standing whether emotional clarity has beneficial interpersonal
effects, in the present study, we examine the association between
emotional clarity and empathy within a stressful context.
Emotional clarity may be a critical precursor to adaptive emo-
tion regulation (Boden & Thompson, 2015). And although emo-
tional clarity is conceptually related to other facets of emotional
experience, including attention to emotion and emotional granu-
larity (i.e., differentiating between emotions; Barrett, Gross, Chris-
tensen, & Benvenuto, 2001), empirical investigations have dem-
onstrated that these constructs are unique. For example, a recent
meta-analysis found that emotional clarity and attention to emo-
tions are only moderately, positively associated (Boden & Thomp-
son, 2017). In addition, emotional clarity was not significantly
related to emotion differentiation in two samples, and emotional
clarity and differentiation showed differential relations to other
aspects of emotional experience (e.g., affect intensity; Boden,
Thompson, Dizén, Berenbaum, & Baker, 2013).
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Whereas emotional clarity is understanding one’s own emo-
tions, empathy involves feeling, sharing, and understanding other
people’s emotions. Empathy is often cited as a motivation for
prosocial behaviors, such as altruism (Batson, 2010); however,
systematic study of empathy and its relation to interpersonal out-
comes has resulted in equivocal findings partly due to the diverse
definitions of empathy. Early research on empathy treated it as a
broad construct (Smith, 2006). More recently, researchers have
proposed an integrative model of empathy as a process composed
of interrelated subcomponents (Hoffman, 2008; Jolliffe & Far-
rington, 2006; Smith, 2006). This cognitive-affective model of
empathy synthesizes several cognitive and affective processes that
are viewed as integral for empathy. Cognitive empathy is the
ability to understand or infer what others are thinking and feeling.
Affective empathy is the emotional response one has to other
people’s emotional displays (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006). Cogni-
tive empathy includes processes like empathic accuracy, emotion
recognition, and theory of mind, whereas affective empathy in-
cludes processes like empathic distress and emotional experience
sharing. The cognitive-affective model of empathy integrates one’s
understanding of others’ with one’s corollary emotional experi-
ences.
Empathy has been assessed directly through self-report measures or
via indirect behavioral or physiological measures. Empathy is typi-
cally seen as a socially desirable trait, which may inflate reporting
biases, suggesting indirect measures may provide more objective
measures of empathy (Fazio & Olson, 2003). One performance-based
measure of cognitive empathy, empathic accuracy, is indexed as the
similarity between a target’s self-reported emotions and a perceiver’s
reports of the target’s emotions (Ickes, 2001). Research on empathic
accuracy has focused on its associations with broad domains of
functioning (e.g., intelligence, global personality; Davis & Kraus,
1997). Only recently, researchers have begun exploring the associa-
tions between empathic accuracy and individual differences in
emotion-related traits (e.g., negative emotion differentiation; Erbas,
Sels, Ceulemans, & Kuppens, 2016). However, the important link
between understanding one’s own emotions (i.e., emotional clarity)
and accurately understanding others’ (i.e., empathic accuracy/cogni-
tive empathy) has yet to be addressed.
Emotional clarity and cognitive empathy both involve meta-
knowledge about emotional experiences: emotional clarity is un-
derstanding one’s own emotions, whereas cognitive empathy is
recognizing and understanding other people’s emotions. In con-
trast, affective empathy is largely experiential in nature. If people
are able to accurately identify and describe their own emotional
states, this may be a skill that generalizes or shares cognitive-
affective mechanisms with the perception of other people’s emo-
tions. Emotional clarity and cognitive empathy impact emotional
experiences via their focus on knowledge of emotions and share
greater conceptual overlap than emotional clarity and affective
empathy. For this reason, we expect that emotional clarity will be
positively related to cognitive, but not affective, empathy. Al-
though people can have strong emotional reactions to others (i.e.,
high affective empathy), they may vary in how well they are able
to identify or describe their emotional responses (e.g., “I feel really
bad for you” [high affective empathy, low emotional clarity] vs.
“My heart aches in sadness for you” [high affective empathy, high
emotional clarity]). However, people who can accurately identify
how they feel, may be able to apply similar skills and clues to
discern how others feel as well.
Additionally, if people are high in emotional clarity, they may
require less time and cognitive resources to discern their own
emotions. According to Zaki’s (2014) theory of motivated empa-
thy, when people engage in an empathic interaction, they must
determine whether they have the proper cognitive/affective re-
sources to do so. The theory suggests that people can appraise
empathy as being too difficult based on the demands of the
situation, their own emotional state, and their appraisal of how
being empathic will make them feel (e.g., emotionally exhausted).
Compared to someone low in emotional clarity, someone high in
emotional clarity may be better able to direct their attention to
understanding how another person feels and how to respond to the
other’s emotions. Thus, people high in emotional clarity may have
greater cognitive resources available and feel more motivated for
distinguishing a target’s emotions. Alternatively, people lower in
emotional clarity may be spending cognitive resources discerning
their own emotional reactions and, consequently, be limited in
their ability to dedicate cognitive resources toward understanding
a targets’ emotions (Vine, Aldao, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014).
The central aim of the current study was to examine the association
between emotional clarity and empathy. We used self-report measures
of trait-level emotional clarity and empathy (both cognitive and af-
fective). We also examined whether participants’ (i.e., perceivers’)
emotional clarity was associated with having more accurate cognitive
empathy for video recordings of people (i.e., targets) who were
undergoing a standardized stressful laboratory task, the Trier Social
Stress Test (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). The present
study involved perceivers rating how they thought targets were feel-
ing and comparing these ratings to the targets’ self-reports, with
greater accuracy reflecting greater cognitive empathy. The stressful
context of the task deviates from standard empathic performance/
accuracy designs in which perceivers watch targets either recall pleas-
ant or unpleasant memories (e.g., Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008) or
engage in a marital conflict interaction (e.g., Soto & Levenson, 2009).
Our design allowed us to measure both positive affect (PA) and
negative affect (NA) during the same stimuli, which is more consis-
tent with real life stressful situations. However, because the task
targets were undergoing was stressful, any observed associations
between clarity and empathy should be interpreted within a stressful
context.
In the present study, our first aim was to test whether self-reported
emotional clarity would be significantly related to self-reported cog-
nitive, but not affective, empathy (Hypothesis 1). Our second aim was
twofold. First, we tested whether self-reported emotional clarity was
positively associated with cognitive empathy assessed using a
performance-based measure. Second, we examined cognitive empa-
thy separately by valence of emotion. It may be more socially adap-
tive and relevant to one’s goals to place greater attention on a target’s
NA in a stressful context because it may prepare one to appropriately
give support in real-life stressful situations (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990;
Thompson, Cowan, & Rosenhan, 1980). Accuracy for negative emo-
tional facial expressions has also been found to be higher when the
context is also negative (Milanak & Berenbaum, 2014). Therefore, we
expected perceivers to have more accurate cognitive empathy perfor-
mance for NA than PA (Hypothesis 2a). We also hypothesized that
emotional clarity would be associated with greater cognitive empathy
of NA, not PA (Hypothesis 2b). Negative emotional facial expres-
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2 ECKLAND, LEYRO, MENDES, AND THOMPSON
sions tend to be judged with higher accuracy in negative contexts
generally, but specific contextual cues (e.g., priming with a certain
emotion word like “anger”) have been associated with incorrect
identification of other negative facial expressions (e.g., sadness; e.g.,
Aviezer et al., 2008; Wieser & Brosch, 2012). Thus, in a generally
stressful context, emotional clarity may facilitate more nuanced un-
derstanding of others’ negative emotions. Because PA is unexpected
in a stressful context, it may be surprising and become salient (i.e.,
surprise-attention link; Horstmann, 2015) to all perceivers indepen-
dent of their emotional clarity.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Our sample (i.e., perceivers) consisted of 94 (68.4% female) un-
dergraduate students at a private Midwestern university. They were
63.2% European American (i.e., white), 7.4% African American,
32.6% Asian American, 5.3% Latino American, and 4.3% indicated
another race. Their ages ranged from 17 to 23 (M  19.34 years,
SD  1.11). Related studies in the literature (e.g., Zaki, Bolger, &
Ochsner, 2008; Gadassi, Mor, & Rafaeli, 2011) have found small to
moderate associations between personality variables and empathic
accuracy. Based on these findings, we determined our sample would
be sufficient to detect medium effects with 80% power.
Participants completed individual laboratory sessions that lasted
approximately 90 minutes and received research credit for their
participation. After providing informed consent, participants com-
pleted a series of self-report measures, which were presented in a
random order and administered on a computer. Then, following
verbal instructions, participants completed the cognitive empathy
task. Finally, participants were provided with a verbal debriefing.
The study was approved by a university institutional review board.
Self-Report Measures
Emotional clarity. Perceivers’ emotional clarity was assessed
using a 13-item, empirically derived and validated self-report
measure. The items were five reverse-scored items from the dif-
ficulty identifying feelings subscale of the Toronto Alexithymia
Scale-20 (TAS; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) and eight items
from the emotional clarity subscale of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale
(TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). The
items were recommended by Palmieri, Boden, and Berenbaum
(2009) based on the results of a factor analysis. Example items
include: “I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling
(reverse-scored TAS item)” and “I can’t make sense out of my
feelings (reverse-scored TMMS item).” Items were rated on a
5-point scale (1  strongly disagree, 5  strongly agree). Items
were averaged with higher scores representing greater emotional
clarity. Internal consistency of the items in the current sample was
excellent (  .92).
Empathy. The 20-item Basic Empathy Scale (Jolliffe & Far-
rington, 2006) was used to measure perceivers’ empathy. The scale
includes a 9-item cognitive subscale (e.g., “I have trouble figuring
out when my friends are happy”) and an 11-item affective subscale
(e.g., “I get caught up in other people’s feelings easily”). Partici-
pants rated the extent to which they agree with each statement on
a 5-point scale (1  strongly disagree, 5  strongly agree).
Internal consistency was good for the items of the affective sub-
scale (  .84) and moderate for the cognitive subscale (  .69).
Performance-Based Measure: Cognitive Empathy
In addition to self-reported empathy, we employed an ecologi-
cally valid index of cognitive empathy using a performance-based
approach. Participants watched a series of video recordings of
people (i.e., targets) completing a stressful laboratory task; a
modified Trier Social Stress Task (TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, &
Hellhammer, 1993). Targets were white, non-Hispanic females
(mean age  24.75, SD  2.55 years) recruited to participate in
another study who consented to their videos being used in future
research. For the TSST, targets were instructed that they would be
given two minutes to prepare for a 5-minute speech on why they
should be hired for their dream job (i.e., prep phase). They were
told that they would give the speech to a panel of expert judges
(i.e., speech phase) and then answer 5-minute of interview ques-
tions posed by the judges (i.e., Q&A phase). After instructions
about the speech, the targets immediately began the 2-minute
prep phase. The targets were sitting in a chair, connected to
psychophysiology equipment and were video-recorded during
all three phases of the TSST: the prep, speech, and Q&A.
During the speech phase, half the participants were randomly
assigned to receive positive feedback from the judges (e.g.,
smiling, nodding) or negative feedback (e.g., eye rolling, look-
ing uninterested; see Akinola & Mendes, 2008). The feedback
conditions served to increase variance in affect, cognition, and
physiology across participants. We selected half of the targets from
the positive feedback condition and half of the targets from the
negative feedback condition. Targets completed self-reports of PA
and NA assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Scale
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) with three items
added for each PA (i.e., cheerful, pleased, happy) and NA (i.e.,
sad, discouraged, grouchy) after both the prep phase (PA items:
  .94; NA items:   .78) and Q&A phase (PA items:   .95;
NA items:   .92).
Perceivers watched four 1-minute video clips from eight targets
(i.e., 32 min in total). For each target, perceivers watched the
second (i.e., last) minute of the prep phase, the first minute of
the speech phase, and the first and last minutes of the Q&A phase.
The videos for each target were always presented in chronological
order: prep minute 2, speech minute 1, Q&A minute 1, and Q&A
minute 5. Targets’ footage was presented in three blocks (two
blocks of three targets and one block of two targets) with the
blocks being presented in random order, using E-Prime (Psychol-
ogy Software Tools, 2012). Although the parent study recorded
both the targets and the judges, for the current investigation, the
videos were cropped so that only the target participant could be
seen; consequently, perceivers only had access to the targets’
responses to the stressful task, not contextual information from the
judges.
After viewing each 1-minute video, perceivers made a series of
ratings about how they perceived the target to have felt. Perceivers
completed ratings for targets’ current PA and NA using the same
scales the targets used to report on their current PA and NA. Each
emotion was displayed individually, with perceivers pressing the
corresponding number on the keyboard to submit their rating for
each emotion (1  not at all, 5  extremely). The emotion words
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
3EMOTIONAL CLARITY AND EMPATHY
were presented in random order. The present paper focuses on
ratings made after prep minute 2 (hereafter called prep phase or
pre-stressor) and after Q&A minute 5 (hereafter called Q&A phase
or post-stressor) that correspond with the targets’ self-reported NA
and PA. We took the absolute differences between target and
perceiver ratings of NA and PA across the eight targets for both
prep and Q&A phases; then we averaged these difference scores to
compute cognitive empathy separately by valence for the prep
and Q&A phases. Accuracy scores closer to zero reflected greater
accuracy. We will refer to these as cognitive empathy ratings as
NA pre-stressor, PA pre-stressor, NA post-stressor, and PA post-
stressor.
Results
To aid in interpreting the study’s findings detailed below, means
and standard deviations for targets and perceivers ratings of tar-
gets’ affect are reported in Table 1. Importantly, there was high
variation in individual differences in performance-based cognitive
empathy, ranging from 0 (i.e., perfect accuracy) to 3.10 (i.e.,
moderate accuracy based on the range [i.e., 0–4] of possible
scores).
Hypothesis 1: Is Self-Reported Emotion Clarity
Uniquely Related to Self-Reported Cognitive but Not
Affective Empathy?
To test our first hypothesis, we conducted Pearson zero-order
correlations. As shown in Table 2 and consistent with our hypoth-
esis, we found emotional clarity was significantly related to cog-
nitive empathy, but not affective empathy. We tested whether
emotional clarity would show an association with cognitive em-
pathy after taking into account affective empathy (i.e., using a
partial correlation). When controlling for affective empathy, the
association became even stronger, r  .36, p  .01.
Hypothesis 2a: Does Performance-Based Cognitive
Empathy Vary by Type of Affect?
We conducted a 2 2 (affect: PA, NA; time of rating: pre-stressor,
post-stressor) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) of
cognitive empathy. We found a main effect for affect, F(1, 93) 
17.04, p .01, and the time of rating, F(1, 93) 15.06, p .01. As
expected, performance-based cognitive empathy for NA was higher
than for PA, and ratings made after the stressor were more accurate
than ratings made after prep. There was also a significant interaction
between affect and time of rating, F(1, 93)  7.52, p  .01. This
interaction indicates that depending on the time of the ratings, PA and
NA were rated differently. To interpret this interaction, we graphed
the estimated marginal means. As shown in Figure 1, the interaction
effect reflects the highest accuracy (closest to 0) is achieved when
rating NA post-stressor.
Hypothesis 2b: Is Emotional Clarity Positively
Associated With More Accurate Cognitive Empathy of
NA, but Not PA?
Next, we tested whether emotional clarity was associated with
more accurate cognitive empathy in a stressful context using regres-
sion models for cognitive empathy of PA and NA for prep and Q&A
phases. As expected, emotional clarity did not predict more accurate
empathic performance for PA at either phase (See Table 3 for a
summary of the models). Inconsistent with Hypothesis 2b, emotional
clarity did not predict higher accuracy of NA pre-stressor. Emotional
clarity was, however, significantly associated with greater cognitive
empathy for NA post-stressor, b  .15, p  .02.
Discussion
Emotional clarity is empirically linked to several important
intrapersonal outcomes, but its associations with interpersonal
outcomes are largely unexplored. To understand the utility of
higher emotional clarity in promoting interpersonal relationships,
using a multimethod approach, we examined the relation between
emotional clarity and affective and cognitive empathy. Consistent
with our expectations, we found that emotional clarity was posi-
Table 2
Pearson Correlations Between Self-Report Measures of
Emotional Clarity and Empathy
Measure 1 2 3
1. Emotional clarity —
2. Cognitive empathy .27 —
3. Affective empathy .07 .51 —
Mean (SD) 3.49 (.69) 4.04 (.41) 3.65 (.61)
 p  .05.
Table 1
Descriptives of Targets’ Affect, Perceivers’ Ratings of Targets’ Affect, and Perceivers’ Cognitive Empathy
Measure
Targets’ self-reported affect
Perceivers’ ratings of targets’
affect
Perceiver’s performance-based
cognitive empathy
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range
Pre-stressor
PA 2.80 (.64) 2.20–4.10 2.23 (.78) 1.00–5.00 .935 (.701) 0–3.10
NA 1.68 (.51) 1.10–2.80 2.09 (.79) 1.00–4.40 .790 (.612) 0–2.90
Post-stressor
PA 2.87 (.80) 1.80–3.90 2.86 (.76) 1.00–5.00 .886 (.613) 0–2.90
NA 1.33 (.38) 1.00–2.10 1.79 (.70) 1.00–4.20 .647 (.615) 0–3.10
Note. PA positive affect; NA negative affect; Pre-stressor Ratings made after Preparation portion of the TSST; Post-stressor Ratings made after
Question and Answer portion of the TSST. Cognitive empathy was calculated by taking the absolute difference between perceiver and target ratings.
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4 ECKLAND, LEYRO, MENDES, AND THOMPSON
tively associated with cognitive empathy, one form of empathy
that is associated with social functioning (Smith, 2006). Further, in
a performance-based task in which perceivers rated targets’ affect
after targets went through a stressful experience, we found that
perceiver’s emotional clarity was positively associated with accu-
racy in perceiving targets’ NA. These findings provide evidence
using various methods that higher emotional clarity is related to
being a more accurate judge of others’ emotions.
We found support that self-reported emotional clarity was associ-
ated with cognitive, but not affective, empathy (Hypothesis 1). We
also found that self-reported emotional clarity was positively associ-
ated with cognitive empathy using a performance-based measure. Our
results across multiple methods suggest that emotional clarity has a
unique association with specific empathic processes, not a general
relation to empathy. Emotional clarity and cognitive empathy may be
associated because both constructs involve identifying and describing
emotional experiences—of oneself for emotional clarity and of others
for cognitive empathy. In addition, neural mechanisms implicated in
the experience of emotional clarity and cognitive empathy may over-
lap (Larsen, Brand, Bermond, & Hijman, 2003), such as the ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex, which shows activation during affect labeling
tasks (Lieberman, Inagaki, Tabibnia, & Crockett, 2011).
Certain subcomponents of affective empathy (i.e., emotional
experience sharing) may impact the relationship between emo-
tional clarity and cognitive empathy. For example, if a perceiver is
sharing in a target’s affective experience (emotional experience
sharing) and the perceiver has clarity on their own emotional state
(emotional clarity), then the perceiver should know how the target
is feeling (cognitive empathy). This may only hold for people high
in these traits and suggests that people have accurate knowledge
that they are sharing in an experience (which suggests more
cognitive empathy is also involved). Using our data, we tested the
hypothesis that association between emotional clarity and cogni-
tive empathy depends on affective empathy (see online supplement
for more information).
In addition to a self-report measure of empathy, we administered a
performance-based measure of cognitive empathy. This performance-
based measure allowed us to assess cognitive empathy separately for
NA and PA, which was not possible with the self-report measure.
Although perceivers’ accuracy for both NA and PA was quite high,
accuracy of NA was higher than accuracy of PA, as we expected
(Hypothesis 2a). In stressful interpersonal situations, understanding
others’ NA, rather than PA, should be more interpersonally advanta-
geous (Thompson, Cowan, & Rosenhan, 1980). Of course, it might be
the case that there was simply more NA expressed from the targets
than PA in the context of the chosen paradigm. Yet, understanding
how others feel, a component of emotional attunement (Gottman,
2011), may be interpersonally beneficial especially in a stressful
context. For example, one might better respond to the other person’s
needs, which is an integral part of building trust in relationships (e.g.,
marriages; Gottman, 1994, 2011).
Finally, we examined the relation between emotional clarity and
performance-based cognitive empathy separately for NA and PA
(Hypothesis 2b). We expected emotional clarity to be associated
with cognitive empathy of NA not PA in a stressful context.
Consistent with this, emotional clarity was positively associated
with accurate cognitive empathy of NA after the TSST stressor.
One possible explanation for why emotional clarity would more
strongly relate to empathy for NA, but not PA, is the understand-
ing/cognitive component of empathy for PA and empathy for NA
may differ. In the English language, there are more words for NA
than PA (Averill, 1975), so cognitive empathy of NA may be much
more difficult than cognitive empathy of PA. In general, it may be
easier for people to engage in empathy for PA than NA, which may
help explain why emotional clarity would predict empathy of NA,
but not PA.
Recent research suggests emotional clarity varies by valence.
For example, people with major depressive disorder, a condition
associated with lower trait emotional clarity (Brockmeyer et al.,
2012), evidence lower emotional clarity of NA, but not PA
(Thompson et al., 2015). Future research may benefit from further
clarifying the link between emotional clarity and empathy by
examining emotion clarity by valence and empathy in positive and
negative contexts. In fact, recent theories and evidence suggest
empathy for PA is a distinct construct/process than empathy for
NA (Morelli, Lieberman, & Zaki, 2015). For example, empathy for
PA is characterized as an ability to share, understand, and cele-
brate/enjoy other’s positive emotions, and is related to distinct
outcomes (e.g., feeling warmth, PA, and socially connected) that
Table 3
Linear Models of Self-Reported Emotional Clarity Predicting
Performance-Based Measure of Cognitive Empathy
Measure b SE  R2 p
PA accuracy: Pre-stressor
Intercept .77 .16 .001
Emotional clarity .05 .04 .110 .012 .292
NA accuracy: Pre-stressor
Intercept .94 .17 .001
Emotional clarity .04 .05 .094 .009 .368
PA accuracy: Post-stressor
Intercept .89 .11 .001
Emotional clarity .01 .03 .002 .000 .986
NA accuracy: Post-stressor
Intercept 1.19 .23 .001
Emotional clarity .15 .07 .241 .058 .019
Note. PA  positive affect; NA  negative affect; Pre-stressor  accu-
racy after preparation phase; Post-stressor  accuracy after question and
answer phase.
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Figure 1. Trier social stress test phase by affect valence predicting
performance-based cognitive empathy. Responses closer to 0 indicate
greater accuracy. PA  positive affect; NA  negative affect.
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5EMOTIONAL CLARITY AND EMPATHY
are not necessarily associated with empathy for NA. Our findings
align with and expand on this work by suggesting emotional clarity
has implications for empathy of NA but not PA.
Given that we only tested the association between emotional
clarity and cognitive empathy in a stressful situation, our results
should be interpreted within that context however. It may be
possible that the association between emotional clarity and cogni-
tive empathy may differ in other contexts (e.g., pleasant situations,
neutral social interactions). That is, in pleasant, nonstressful con-
texts, researchers could find an opposite pattern of results (i.e.,
emotional clarity related to empathy for PA, not NA) because NA
would stand out in a pleasant context, independent of emotional
clarity. Or emotional clarity may not be related to cognitive em-
pathy in pleasant contexts because the stakes for having accurate
empathy are lower. For these reasons, future research should test
the association between emotional clarity and empathy by valence
across other contexts.
It is also important to note that the significant association
between emotional clarity and cognitive empathy of NA after the
stressor was relatively small. This is not surprising given that
self-report and implicit/performance measures rarely tend to cor-
relate strongly (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Related research in the
emotional intelligence literature, which includes aspects of emo-
tional understanding (i.e., emotional clarity) and emotion recogni-
tion/perception (i.e., aspects of cognitive empathy; Salovey et al.,
1995), demonstrates self-reported emotional intelligence is weakly
positively related to performance-based measures of emotional
intelligence (e.g., Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence
Test; Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006). Thus,
the results of our study are consistent with related extant research.
Our result that higher emotional clarity is associated with more
accurate cognitive empathy has important clinical and real-world
implications. Low emotional clarity is found across a variety of
psychological disorders (Vine & Aldao, 2014) and improving
emotional clarity is often part of many psychological treatments
(e.g., trauma-focused cognitive–behavioral therapy [Cohen, Ber-
liner, & Mannarino, 2010], mindfulness-based cognitive therapy
[Kabat-Zinn, 2003]). Because our study was cross-sectional in
design, we cannot examine directionality of the observed associ-
ations. Increasing emotional clarity might improve people’s ability
to navigate their social world through increased cognitive empa-
thy, or increasing cognitive empathy may help to improve emo-
tional clarity, or the emotional clarity and cognitive empathy may
be bidirectionally related. In addition, emotional clarity may also
help one regulate others’ emotions in real life stressful situations,
specifically through enhanced cognitive empathy. People high in
emotional clarity may be able to identify and describe others’
emotions more accurately and respond in more context-appropriate
ways. Future work should expand on the social implications for
emotional clarity, including its role in interpersonal emotion reg-
ulation (Zaki & Williams, 2013).
Limitations and Future Directions
Although the current study presents initial evidence that emotional
clarity relates to cognitive empathy and empathic performance, our
study design has limitations. First, theoretically relevant findings
suggested a small to medium size association between emotional
clarity and cognitive empathy. Given the small effect size we ob-
served for our main finding, future studies should attempt to replicate
this effect with larger samples. Second, the targets were all white
women, which allowed us to keep the race of the targets constant but
had the disadvantage of the targets not being racially representative of
the United States population. Because our sample was undergraduate
students, we chose the targets to be close in age as previous research
has shown empathy is greatest for people within the same age group
(Hoffman, 2008). However, it will be important for future research to
examine perceivers who are older. Second, although we showed
videos from the prep phase, speech phase, as well as the first and last
minutes of the Q&A phase from the TSST, we could only calculate
performance-based cognitive empathy from ratings made at the prep
(i.e., pre-stressor) and final Q&A phases (i.e., post-stressor). This is
because we wanted to make one-to-one comparisons between targets’
and perceivers’ ratings and targets only rated their emotions imme-
diately before and after the TSST. It was not possible to have targets
rate their emotions every minute without disturbing the procedures of
the task.
Additionally, there are two limitations associated with our as-
sessment of affective empathy. First, our behavioral task did not
measure affective empathy, so it will be important for future
research using behavioral tasks to do so. For example, researchers
could assess perceivers’ reactions to targets by filming their reac-
tions to watching targets and coding facial expressions (e.g., Facial
Action Coding System; Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002) or using
facial electromyography to obtain measures of facial mimicry.
Second, although we administered an affective empathy self-report
measure (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006), the measure does not de-
lineate components of affective empathy, such as emotional expe-
rience sharing and empathic distress. The current study begins to
elucidate the association between emotional clarity and cognitive
and affective empathy, but future studies would benefit by mea-
suring perceiver’s emotional reactions to targets.
Conclusions
Using a multimethod approach, we were able to demonstrate a
unique relation between emotional clarity and cognitive empathy
within a stressful context. We found an association between our
participants’ emotional clarity and their empathic performance on
a difficult task. Participants could discern, with high accuracy, the
emotions of strangers in video recordings. We expect that the asso-
ciation between emotional clarity and empathic performance would
be even stronger in in-person interactions and with people who know
each other. This relation is important because it may reflect shared
mechanisms for understanding one’s own feelings and understanding
how others feel, which may help maintain healthy relationships.
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